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I. INTRODUCTION
On August 30, 2011, Wikileaks released the latest batch of
classified U.S. Department of State cables, revealing significant
insights related to various aspects of the United States’ foreign and
trade policy. In highlighting the severity of the leaks, The Economist
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remarked, “if Cyberspace had air, it would be thick with
recrimination.”1 Of particular interest to this paper are those cables
related to the United States’ foreign policy implementing and
enforcing intellectual property in developing countries. The leaks
draw a bleak picture, in which U.S. interest groups and local agents
collaborate to achieve higher levels of intellectual property
protection in developing countries, without taking into consideration
the public interest and consumer rights of local communities. This
“act of state-sponsored violence,” as some have proclaimed it,2
jeopardizes the lives of millions of citizens across the globe. It also
undermines the foundations of the global multilateral trading regime
and its institutions, particularly the World Trade Organization
(“WTO”), which was created by the global community in 1995 to put
an end to bilateralism and multilaterally regulate global trade in
goods and services.
Although the leaks contain references to many other U.S.
initiatives and efforts aimed toward strengthening and enforcing
intellectual property protection in many developing countries, this
study will focus on those leaks related to the implementation of the
U.S.-Jordan bilateral free trade agreement3 (“FTA”) signed in 2001
in the area of intellectual property protection. Bilateral FTAs
between powerful, industrialized countries and regions, particularly
the United States and European Union, and poorer, developing
countries have proliferated over the past decade. As now
acknowledged by many, the signing of an FTA represents the
beginning of a long and winding road, but there is little analysis of
what actually happens following the conclusion of a bilateral free
trade agreement. This is particularly true in the area of intellectual
property protection, which affects the lives of millions in developing
countries. One reason for the lack of analysis of the implementation
of FTAs is that, in most cases, these agreements are negotiated,
1. Wikileaks: Swept Up and Away, ECONOMIST, Sept. 10, 2011,
http://www.economist.com/node/21528600/print.
2. James Love, In Defense of WikiLeaks: Looking at Cables on
Pharmaceutical Drugs and Trade Pressures, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 4, 2011,
3:43
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-love/wikileaks-cablespharmaceutical-drugs_b_947806.html.
3. Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, Oct.
24, 2000, 41 I.L.M. 63 [hereinafter U.S.-Jordan FTA].
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signed, and implemented secretly, behind closed doors, with little
public debate and participation.4 This study analyzes the
implementation of the U.S.-Jordan FTA based on a thorough review
of recent releases of the Wikileaks cables, supplemented by the
observations and experience of the author in the region.
This study is a first attempt at analyzing and explaining the
process that transpires during the signing of an FTA between a
developed and a developing country. The case of Jordan is
invaluable for many reasons. First, the U.S.-Jordan FTA was the
first FTA the United States signed with any Arab or Muslim
country.5 Second, the U.S.-Jordan FTA was the first agreement of
its type that contained several intellectual property obligations of a
TRIPS-Plus nature.6 Third, the U.S.-Jordan FTA is one of the few
agreements where the impacts of FTAs on developing countries
have been studied. Research findings have alarmingly affirmed the
negative impact arising from the implementation of comparable
FTAs in developing countries, particularly in the area of public
health and access to medicine.7 Within this context, this article will
4. See generally Brian J. Schoenborn, Public Participation in Trade
Negotiations: Open Agreements, Openly Arrived At?, 4 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
103, 135–37 (1995) (discussing the importance of balancing the democratic
interest in public disclosure with the degree of confidentiality inherent in the
contractual treaty negotiation process).
5. See Mohammed El Said, The Evolution of the Jordanian TRIPS-Plus
Model: Multilateralism Versus Bilateralism and the Implications for the Jordanian
IPRs Regime, 37 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 501, 513 (2006)
[hereinafter El Said, Multilateralism Versus Bilateralism] (emphasizing the
historical significance of the U.S.-Jordan FTA in that it has become a “cornerstone
for the subsequent agreements signed between the US and other nations in the new
era of trade bilateralism”); Background Note: Jordan, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Dec.
30, 2011), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3464.htm.
6. Accord Mohammed El Said, The Road from TRIPS-Minus to TRIPS to
TRIPS-Plus: Implications of IPRs for the Arab World, 8 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP.
53, 61 (2005) (citing, for example, the obligation to “treat geographical indications
as trademarks for the purposes of protection registration and implementation”); see
Peter Drahos, BITS and BIPS: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4 J. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. 791, 792, 797–98 (2001) (explaining that “TRIPS Plus” may allow
for more extensive protection than TRIPS standards, and it allows members to
qualify, or choose amongst, TRIPS standards).
7. See MOHAMMED EL SAID, WORLD HEALTH ORG. & INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE
& SUSTAINABLE DEV., PUBLIC HEALTH RELATED TRIPS-PLUS PROVISIONS IN
BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: A POLICY GUIDE FOR NEGOTIATORS AND
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use information obtained through Wikileaks to make a more
detailed assessment of the process of surveillance and
implementation that U.S. authorities undertook following the
signing of a bilateral FTA.
Although the main concern of this study is the domestic process
associated with setting and creating intellectual property−protection
norms and regulations in developing countries (particularly Jordan),
the study also highlights how this process relates to the global
debate over intellectual property norms. It reveals the rivalry
between the main players—the United States and the European
Union—in this area and their efforts to push the boundaries of
intellectual property protection in developing countries. Based on
this finding, the study explains the complexities associated with
national norm-setting initiatives and concludes that the process of
setting and implementing intellectual property norms at the national
level should not be viewed in isolation from other major global
developments. What this study will not do is delve into the
substantive details of the intellectual property TRIPS-Plus
provisions included under the U.S.-Jordan FTA, as this has been
dealt with extensively elsewhere.8

II. THE BEGINNINGS
Jordan has maintained strong relations with the United States since
its creation as an emirate in the early 1920s.9 Jordan’s geography,
IMPLEMENTERS IN THE WHO EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN REGION 16 (2010)
[hereinafter EL SAID, PUBLIC HEALTH RELATED TRIPS-PLUS PROVISIONS IN
BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS]; Mohammed El Said, All Costs, No Benefits:
How TRIPS-Plus Intellectual Property Rules in the US-Jordan FTA Affect Access
to Medicines, OXFAM INT’L (Oxfam Briefing Paper No. 102, 2007), at 2 (“[D]ata
exclusivity [in Jordan] has delayed generic competition for 79 percent of
medicines newly launched by 21 multinational pharmaceutical companies between
2002 and mid-2008.”); Hamed El Said & Mohammed El Said, TRIPS-Plus
Implications for Access to Medicines in Developing Countries: Lessons from
Jordan-United States Free Trade Agreement, 10 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 438, 445
(2007) (highlighting the vast shift IPR protection has undergone in Jordan since
1973, at which time patent protection was only afforded to processes, which
permitted the legal manufacture of generic drugs, which were developed, tested,
and patented in other countries).
8. El Said, Multilateralism Versus Bilateralism, supra note 5.
9. E.g., Background Note: Jordan, supra note 5 (“Relations between the
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demography, pragmatic leadership, and, more recently, its
involvement in the United States’ “War on Terror” ensured
continuous special relationships with various U.S. administrations,
with few exceptions.10
The close relationship between Jordan and the United States is
evidenced by the exceptional military and financial support Jordan
has received from the United States over the years.11 Jordan is one of
the largest recipients of U.S. aid in the world. Since 1951, the
country received approximately $11.38 billion in U.S. aid, third only
to Israel and Egypt in the region.12 On September 22, 2008, the U.S.
and Jordanian governments reached an agreement, whereby the
United States would provide a total of $660 million in annual foreign
assistance to Jordan over a five-year period.13
Jordan has signed a number of bilateral agreements with the
United States during the past two decades. For instance, a bilateral
“open skies” Aviation Agreement and a Bilateral Investment Treaty
(“BIT”) were signed between the two countries in 1996 and 2003,
respectively.14 Additionally, in 1996, the U.S. Congress created
Qualifying Industrial Zones (“QIZ”) to support the peace process
through the peace treaty signed between Jordan and Israel in 1994.15
United States and Jordan have been close for 6 decades, with 2009 marking the
60th anniversary of U.S.-Jordanian ties.”).
10. But see id. (providing a notable exception to the generally favorable
relations between Jordan and the United States relating to disagreements over the
country’s support for Iraq during the first Gulf War (1990-91)).
11. See generally AVI SHLAIM, LION OF JORDAN: THE LIFE OF KING HUSSEIN IN
WAR AND PEACE (2007) (tracing the history of Jordan with respect to the ArabIsraeli conflict and identifying the level of military and financial assistance
received from the United States).
12. JEREMY M. SHARP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32260, U.S. FOREIGN
ASSISTANCE TO THE MIDDLE EAST: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, RECENT TRENDS,
AND THE FY2011 REQUEST 7 (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
mideast/RL32260.pdf.
13. Id. at 7.
14. Air Transport Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, U.S.-Jordan,
Nov. 10, 1996, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/66317.pdf; Treaty
Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investment, U.S.-Jordan, July 2, 1997, U.S. Sen. Treaty Doc. 106-30.
15. West Bank and Gaza Strip Free Trade Benefits, Pub. L. No. 104-234, 110
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Under the agreement, QIZ goods that contain at least twelve percent
of their value added from Israel enter the United States tariff- and
quota-free. This has had important economic growth implications for
the Jordanian economy and turned the United States into Jordan’s
main trading partner (replacing Iraq) by encouraging and increasing
Jordan’s exportation of light manufactured products such as
garments.
The two countries signed a Science and Technology Cooperation
Agreement in 2007 to facilitate and strengthen mutual scientific
cooperation, as well as a memorandum of understanding on nuclear
energy cooperation.16 U.S. backing ensured Jordan’s speedy
accession to the WTO in 2000 and subsequently paved the way for
the signing of the first bilateral FTA between the United States and
an Arab country in 2001 (the U.S.-Jordan FTA).17
High levels of collaboration between the two countries in the area
of intellectual property have existed for some time. However, it was
often U.S. pressure, triggered by industry groups, that dictated the
terms of the relationship between the two countries. For instance,
until 1999 Jordan was still placed on the United States’ “Section 301
Watch List.”18 The following year, the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (“PhRMA”) went even further by
formally asking the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
(“USTR”) to name Jordan in the next year as a “Priority Watch”
country, for “failing to provide adequate intellectual property
protection.”19 The relationship became less turbulent following the
country’s accession to the WTO and its signing of the FTA with the
Stat. 3058.
16. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on Science and Technology
Cooperation, U.S.-Jordan, Apr. 5, 2007, http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/142911.pdf.
17. Background Note: Jordan, supra note 5.
18. See, Matthew K. Miller, Hong Kong Removed from U.S. Trade
Representative’s Special 301 Watch List, 5 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 12, 12, n.23
(1999) (providing a general overview of the Special 301 Watch List as a warning
signal to the business community and foreign nations that deny adequate
intellectual property protection).
19. Ghalia Alul, PhRMA Requests Jordan Be Placed on “Priority Watch” List,
JORDAN TIMES, Apr. 15, 1998, available at http://www.jordanembassyus.org/
041598002.htm.
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United States in 2000 and 2001, respectively.

III. DOMESTIC PROCESS, GLOBAL AGENDA
The information revealed in Wikileaks reinforces the widely
acknowledged view that the international regulation of intellectual
property was deliberately designed with loopholes that could be
exploited by its drafters. As one author explains:
Since TRIPs, the institutional environment around intellectual property
has gotten much denser, much thicker, and much more heavily populated
with new forums and new actors. The result is an increasingly incoherent
and internally inconsistent intellectual property regime. Much of this
incoherence is a product of strategic forum shifting, in which actors take
their intellectual property concerns to the forums in which they expect to
better achieve their goals. Various interest groups and government
agencies have become heavily invested in increasingly ineffective
approaches to property protection and enforcement.20

The case of Jordan not only conforms to these observations but
also sheds new light on the inconsistencies and loopholes present in
intellectual property regulation, given the explicit influence of the
U.S. government and its lobbyists throughout the negotiation
process. Persuasion, motivation, and threats are some of the tools
used to influence negotiations. These mechanisms are often used
interchangeably to implement and enforce high-level intellectual
property protection (what is often referred to in the literature as
TRIPS-Plus provisions) in many developing countries, including
Jordan.
The United States’ position is formulated primarily by the
collaborative effort of several private interest groups and
governmental agencies that share a unified vision for seeking the
implementation and enforcement of higher intellectual property
protection levels—often of a TRIPS-Plus nature—with their FTA
partner state. These groups and agencies rely on various strategies in
achieving their objectives. The strategies are often complemented by
a “revolving door” policy, through initiating discussions with and
passing messages to various local contacts and other concerned
20. Susan Sell, Everything Old Is New Again: The Development Agenda Then
and Now, 3 WIPO J. 17, 21 (2011).
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official departments and authorities.
A snapshot of the main players involved in this process shows an
intricate web of exchanges and discussions between Jordanian and
American key players. However, it is important first to identify and
explain the role of each of these players and how this process shapes
their positions and objectives.
The key players representing the private sector interests of the
United States include a number of historically well-established
and organized business groups and associations. For instance, both
the Business Software Alliance (“BSA”)21 and the International
Intellectual Property Alliance (“IIPA”)22 have been vocal in their
push for strengthened copyright protection in Jordan. Meanwhile,
the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
(“PhRMA”)23 continues to pursue higher levels of intellectual
property protection in the area of pharmaceutical patents in the
country. These business groups and associations are also
supported by their local representatives, agents, and networks of
contacts.
Unsurprisingly, these business associations were also the most
vocal advocates and enthusiasts for inclusion of strong provisions
21. Cf. BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, http://www.bsa.org/GlobalHome.aspx (last
visited Aug. 16, 2012) (presenting the BSA as the “voice of the world’s
commercial software industry and its hardware partners before governments and in
the international marketplace. BSA programs foster technology innovation through
education and policy initiatives that promote copyright protection, cyber security,
trade, and e-commerce.”).
22. Cf. About IIPA, INT’L INTELLECTUAL PROP. ALLIANCE (Feb. 9, 2012),
http://www.iipa.com/aboutiipa.html (describing the IIPA as “a private sector
coalition, formed in 1984, consisting of trade associations representing U.S.
copyright-based industries in bilateral and multilateral efforts working to improve
international protection and enforcement of copyrighted materials, and open up
foreign markets closed by piracy and other market access barriers”).
23. Cf. About PhRMA, PHRMA.ORG, http://www.phrma.org/about/aboutphrma (last visited Aug. 12, 2012) (“The Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) represents the US’s leading pharmaceutical
research and biotechnology companies, which are devoted to inventing medicines
that allow patients to live longer, healthier, and more productive lives. PhRMA
companies are leading the way in the search for new cures. PhRMA members
alone invested an estimated $49.4 billion in 2010 in discovering and developing
new medicines. Industry-wide research and investment reached an estimated $67.4
billion in 2010.”).
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for intellectual property protection—through the implementation of
the TRIPS Agreement—during the Uruguay Round of Trade
Negotiations. The Uruguay Round lasted from 1986 to 1994 and
culminated in the birth of the WTO. Their efforts were highly
influential in lobbying the U.S. government to include intellectual
property protection in the negotiations agenda and in pressuring
other developing countries to implement higher levels of
intellectual property protection. Commenting on the role of such
groups, one author explains:
These private actors were in a good position in so far as they represented
vigorous export industries that enjoyed positive balances . . . . They were
able to present their industries as part of the solution to America’s trade
woes, as opposed to being part of the problem. They successfully argued
that foreign pirates, particularly in East Asia and Latin America, were
robbing them of hard-earned royalties. They pushed hard for a trade-based
approach to IP protection.24

Today, these same players continue to pursue a “maximalist”
approach to intellectual property and pressure the U.S. government
to pursue higher levels of intellectual property protection and
enforcement in developing countries. Just as in the economic crises
of the 1970s, U.S. industry representatives today present intellectual
property as a cure for present-day economic woes and financial
crises.25
Several U.S. government agencies and bodies also constitute key
players, given their ability to provide official coverage and to
exercise political clout and economic leverage. The U.S. Embassy in
Amman, which often acts as a medium in interactions involving U.S.
players and stakeholders; the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
(“USTR”); the U.S. Agency for International Development
(“USAID”) and its Achievement of Market-Friendly Initiatives and
Results (“AMIR”) Program in Jordan; and the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (“USPTO”) appear to be the most active and
persevering agencies in the push for higher intellectual property

24. SUSAN SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 86 (2003).
25. Deborah Halbert, The Politics of IP Maximalism, 3 WIPO J. 81, 90 (2011).
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protection and enforcement.26 Other agencies and private bodies are
periodically called upon to step in and provide legal review or
technical training and advice. These include the U.S. Food and Drug
Authority (“USFDA”), the Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”),
the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), and the Library
of the U.S. Congress (“LOC”). In addition, a number of local
representatives of large U.S. multinational enterprises (“MNEs”)—
such as Microsoft, Caterpillar, and Chrysler—and other industry
representatives also attended and actively participated in a number of
workshops and seminars focusing on intellectual property protection
and enforcement in Jordan.
On the other hand, the cables clearly reveal inadequate levels of
representation from Jordanian enterprises, agencies, and corporations
in developing intellectual property norms at the national level. In a
situation often prevalent in developing and Arab countries, the
Jordanian position is generally “responsive” with regard to
intellectual property protection.27 Consequently, the limited and
sometimes targeted participation may be confined to a small number
of agencies and/or ministries when discussions on intellectual
property ensue. The main players from the Jordanian side feature the
Ministry of Industry and Trade, the official authority entrusted with
managing industrial property protection in the country; the National
Library, the authority concerned with copyright and neighboring
rights protection, which is part of the Ministry of Culture; and the
Jordan Food and Drug Administration (“JFDA”), an agency
concerned mainly with granting marketing authorizations for drugs
and pharmaceutical products in the country and that is affiliated with
the Jordanian Ministry of Health.

26. See, e.g., GIPA - Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Law and Policy
Program - November 5-8, 2007, Amman, Jordan, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/
ip/events/agenda_jordan.jsp (last visited Aug. 12, 2012) (describing one of the
USPTO’s training programs run by its Global Intellectual Property Academy
(GIPA) in Jordan in 2007).
27. MOHAMMED EL SAID, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
PROTECTION IN THE ARAB WORLD 46 (2008) [hereinafter EL SAID, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN THE ARAB WORLD]
(“These countries often ‘traded away’ the issue of intellectual property in exchange
for concessions in other areas without carefully assessing the impact of these tradeoffs.”).
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In addition, other agencies, officials, and individuals are called
upon in cases where procedural or administrative issues persist,
where additional enforcement levels are sought, or where technical
and legal training and advice are offered.28 Of these, one can identify
the Jordan Institute for Standards and Metrology (“JISM”), the
Jordan Customs Department (“JCD”), and the judiciary as recurring
players. Unlike the United States’ private-sector business groups,
local business groups are fragmented and seem to have limited
presence and influence over the intellectual property policies of the
government in Jordan. On occasion, some local businesses even
align their business interests with those of their U.S. counterparts.29
Overall, the dynamics of the relationship between these
stakeholders and representatives (both from the United States and
Jordan) reflect a general pattern of encouragement and collaboration
where positions are unified.30 When positions are not, criticism is
often associated with suspension—or threat of suspension—of funds
from the U.S. side as a stick-and-carrot policy.
What is of concern here is the evident lack of public input and the
absence of public participation and civil society representation in these
discussions, particularly from the Jordanian side. As will be discussed
in more detail in the ensuing parts of this article, the main theme
emerging from the discussions and negotiations between the U.S.
teams and their Jordanian counterparts is the drive to raise levels of
intellectual property protection and enforcement in Jordan, without
undertaking a proper impact assessment or inviting national debate
about the effects of these provisions on society and consumers.
28. See ALEXANDER W. KOFF ET AL., INT’L INTELLECTUAL PROP. INST., STUDY
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF “TRIPS-PLUS” FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 35
(2011), available at http://www.tradepartnership.com/pdf_files/IIPI%20TRIPSPlus%20Study.pdf (reporting that the United States’ technical assistance has
provided “not only seminars and short training courses but also a group on the
ground in Peru to assist with intellectual property efforts”).
29. For instance, the Jordan Intellectual Property Association (JIPA) often
advocates a pro-protection intellectual property approach.
30. For instance, to intensify the raids against copyright infringers, an
agreement between the National Library and the Business Software Alliance
(BSA) was signed with the aim of identifying those involved in illegal activities.
U.S. Embassy, Cable 05AMMAN8330, Jordan IPR Problems and Solutions:
Part I - Awareness Campaign Tackles Street-Smart Pirates (Oct. 23, 2005),
available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/10/05AMMAN8330.html.

ON THE
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Instead, the key players insert intellectual property rhetoric into
discussions and deliberations, describing higher levels of protection
and enforcement as an anchor for attracting businesses, high
technology and know-how, and foreign direct investment (“FDI”),
without providing substantial evidence supporting such claims.
The next part of this article will present specific examples that
demonstrate the United States’ tactics in mobilizing its stakeholders
and governmental agencies in pursuance of strengthened TRIPS-Plus
intellectual property protection levels and enforcement procedures in
Jordan.

IV. LAYING DOWN THE FOUNDATIONS
Because the U.S.-Jordan FTA was the first FTA signed between
the United States and an Arab or a Muslim state, the agreement
became a template for subsequent FTAs signed in the Middle East.
Moreover, the U.S.-Jordan FTA was one of the first bilateral
agreements to include extensive TRIPS-Plus provisions. These
provisions had noticeable impacts on many development-related
areas.31 In particular, the agreement contains several TRIPS-Plus
provisions, which directly affect public health and access to medicine
in the country. These may be summarized as follows:
1. Data exclusivity protection. The U.S.-Jordan FTA obliges
Jordan to provide legal protection for data exclusivity for a
period that may be extended up to eight years. Accordingly,
article 4.22 of the FTA states:
Pursuant to Article 39.3 of TRIPS, each Party, when requiring,
as a condition of approving the marketing of pharmaceutical or
of agricultural chemical products that utilize new chemical
entities, the submission of undisclosed test or other data, or
evidence of approval in another country, the origination of which
involves a considerable effort, shall protect such information
against unfair commercial use. In addition, each Party shall
protect such information against disclosure, except where
31. See EL SAID, PUBLIC HEALTH RELATED TRIPS-PLUS PROVISIONS IN
BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 7 (suggesting that as a result of
signing FTAs, countries in the Eastern Mediterranean Region face difficulties in
creating the proper and adequate public health regimes and in ensuring the
availability and access to medicine for their populations).
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necessary to protect the public or unless steps are taken to ensure
that the information is protected against unfair commercial use.32

2. “New use” legal protection for chemical entities. Although
the TRIPS Agreement does not oblige member states to
provide legal protection for “new use,” the U.S.-Jordan FTA
includes references to this type of protection. In this regard, a
footnote to article 4.22 states:
It is understood that protection for “new chemical entities” shall
also include protection for new uses for old chemical entities for
a period of three years.33

3. Patent-term extension. Article 33 of the TRIPS Agreement
provides that legal protection shall be granted to patents for a
period of twenty years from the date of filing. The U.S.Jordan FTA further extends this period to compensate the
applicant for the time spent during the examination of the
application and/or marketing authorization. Article 4.23 of
the U.S.-Jordan FTA states:
With respect to pharmaceutical products that are subject to a
patent:
a. Each Party shall make available an extension of the patent
term to compensate the patent owner for unreasonable
curtailment of the patent term as a result of the marketing
approval process.34

4. Restrictions on compulsory licensing. The TRIPS Agreement
grants member states the right to grant compulsory licenses.
However, the agreement does not list or specify the grounds
whereby such licenses may be granted but instead awards
member states the discretion to define such grounds.35 On the
32. U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 3, art. 4.22. A footnote to article 4.22 further
states: “It is understood that, in situations where there is reliance on evidence of
approval in another country, Jordan shall at a minimum protect such information
against unfair commercial use for the same period of time the other country is
protecting such information against unfair commercial use.” Id. art. 4.22 n.11.
33. Id. art. 4.22 n.10.
34. Id. art. 4.23.
35. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
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other hand, the U.S.-Jordan FTA lists the grounds on which
such licenses may be granted, hence eroding the policy space
available to Jordan by broadly defining these grounds.
Accordingly, article 4.20 of the FTA states:
Neither Party shall permit the use of the subject matter of a
patent without the authorization of the right holder except in the
following circumstances:
to remedy a practice determined after judicial or
administrative process to be anti-competitive;
in cases of public non-commercial use or in the case of a
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency, provided that such use is limited to use by
government entities or legal entities acting under the
authority of a government; or
on the ground of failure to meet working requirements,
provided that importation shall constitute working.36

The impact of these TRIPS-Plus conditions in the area of public
health and access to medicine is grave. In brief, such measures would
result in prolonging the monopoly terms granted to pharmaceutical
patents and delaying the entrance of generics into the market.37 Such
delays would result in a substantial increase in drug prices, due to
royalty payments, and would increase governmental expenditure on
public health and medicine as a result.38 Some of these effects, as will
be explained in more detail, have already taken place in the country.

Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods art. 30, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal
Instruments — Results of the Uruguay Round, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
36. U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 3, art. 4.20.
37. See KOFF ET AL., supra note 28, at 49 (“Reportedly overlaying U.S.-style
rules over Jordan’s pharmaceutical sector negatively affects the ability of generic
industries to operate, which is why many from Jordan’s generic pharmaceutical
industry view the FTA as TRIPS-‘Minus.’”).
38. For more, see EL SAID, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
PROTECTION IN THE ARAB WORLD, supra note 27.
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V. COSTS WITHOUT BENEFITS: THE MYTHS
After laying the foundation for TRIPS-Plus obligations under the
national legal framework through the FTA, the United States moved
next to interpreting the obligations during their implementation. The
leaked cables provide some interesting illustrations about how the
United States monitors the implementation of intellectual property
obligations of its FTA partner states, particularly with regard to those
commitments related to pharmaceutical patents. More specifically,
the cables explain the interplay between concerned authorities and
groups in both the United States and Jordan and the approach adopted
by each in dealing with intellectual property issues affecting public
health and access to medicine. In general, the U.S. position, backed
by its powerful industry interest groups, is centered on interpreting
intellectual property commitments widely, with a TRIPS-Plus
approach, and conflating public health issues with those related to
intellectual property protection. The Jordanian position, on the other
hand, could be best described as “reactive,” in most cases, and
“reluctant,” in other cases, to heed to the United States’ demands.
The following examples illustrate in greater detail the interplay
between these various players in relation to a number of issues
affecting public health and access to medicine, as revealed by the
leaks.
Data exclusivity appears to be one of the major issues of concern
to the United States included under the U.S.-Jordan FTA.39 Data
exclusivity refers to the procedure wherein originative
pharmaceutical companies are granted a period of time during which
would-be generic producers of existing drugs are prohibited from
obtaining regulatory approval for a competing drug if they rely on
the results of the originator’s clinical trials. Although legal protection
regimes granting data exclusivity predate the signing of the TRIPS
Agreement,40 the United States’ and European Union’s attempts to
39. See Guatemala’s Congress Reinstates Data Protection: The End of the
Problem That Refused to Go Away, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Mar. 3, 2010),
http://www.keionline.org/node/1206 (providing a detailed account of U.S.
government pressure on the Guatemalan legislature to shape legislation on
pharmaceutical test data protection in the country).
40. See Jerome H. Reichman, Rethinking the Role of Clinical Trial Data in
International Intellectual Property Law: The Case for a Public Goods Approach,
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include data exclusivity protection under the auspices of the TRIPS
Agreement were met by fierce resistance. Due to objections from
developing countries, data exclusivity provisions were ultimately
excluded from the TRIPS Agreement.41 However, the United
States—and more recently the European Union—reintroduced data
exclusivity through bilateral FTAs with a number of countries. These
agreements created a de facto legal international protection regime
for data exclusivity, by virtue of article 4 of the TRIPS Agreement,
relating to the most-favored nation (“MFN”) principle.42
In the case of Jordan, the issue of data-exclusivity protection
features extensively in the U.S. cables, despite the global criticism
that data exclusivity has attracted in recent years.43 Fears of the
monopolistic impact of patent-term extension on drug prices and the
curtailment of compulsory licensing appear to have been realized in
Jordan. Nonetheless, Jordan became one of the first Arab countries in
which the issue of data exclusivity surfaced during discussions with
U.S. officials following the signing of the U.S.-Jordan FTA, as
revealed by the cables.
As stated above, the U.S.-Jordan FTA introduces five years of data
exclusivity that commences on the date of registration of a medicine
in the country.44 An additional three years of data exclusivity
(beyond the initial five-year period) are also granted for new uses of
known chemical entities.45 The U.S. cables show how the United

13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 12–16 (2009) (explaining that NAFTA
included some reference to data exclusivity protection, while the European
Community member states have provided protection for data filed in support of
marketing authorizations for pharmaceuticals since 1987).
41. Id. at 17–19.
42. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 35, art. 4 (“With regard to the protection of
intellectual property, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by a
Member to the nationals of any other country shall be accorded immediately and
unconditionally to the nationals of all other Members.”)
43. See U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, GOOD PRACTICE GUIDE: IMPROVING ACCESS
TO TREATMENT BY UTILIZING PUBLIC HEALTH FLEXIBILITIES IN THE WTO TRIPS
AGREEMENT 24–26 (2010) [hereinafter UNDP], available at http://apps.who.int/
medicinedocs/documents/s17762en/s17762en.pdf (identifying “data exclusivity”
as “an additional market protection form for originator pharmaceuticals” and
advising developing nations to refrain from adopting data exclusivity regimes).
44. U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 3, art. 4.22 n.11.
45. Id., art. 4.22 n.10.

2012]

TRIPS-PLUS, FTAS, AND WIKILEAKS

87

States attempted to interpret these provisions in ways that favor its
industry’s interests and views.
One cable dating back to 2005 stated that international
pharmaceutical companies seem to be generally satisfied with the
drug-registration system in Jordan, which is managed mainly by the
Jordan Food and Drug Administration (“JFDA”).46 Despite this, it
was evident that the United States was not satisfied with the
pro−public health approach often adopted by JFDA’s committees.
The 2005 cable further describes the committees operating under the
JFDA as “multi-agency committees [that] do not have the same
reputation [as the JFDA], being holdovers from a former paternalistic
era of healthcare.”47 As demonstrated by the same cable, the United
States attempted on several occasions to influence the decisions of
the JDFA and its committees. In one data exclusivity dispute, the
2005 cable reports:
[A] company filed for protection for a once-a-week-dose drug in 2004
less than a year before the daily dosing would lose its data exclusivity
protection (for the clinical data that, once in the public domain, would
allow a generic firm to make the same drug and market it at reduced
costs) . . . .48

After reaching the court, the case was “dismissed on a technicality
unrelated to the substantive dispute.” Unsatisfied with this result,
which, in the eyes of the U.S. embassy, meant that the generic
company had “won” the dispute, the cable explains that:
Some in the PhRMA community believe it was a breach of the law for the
[government of Jordan] to fail to uphold the FTA obligation to protect
data submitted for the once-weekly dose, regardless of any lawyer court
decision. However, to maintain harmonious relations with its regulator,
the aggrieved company—which continues to believe itself to have been

46. See U.S. Embassy, Cable 05AMMAN9748, Jordan’s IPRS Challenges and
Solutions: Part III - Pharmaceuticals Pose Frontier IPR Issues ¶ 3 (Dec. 19, 2005),
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05AMMAN9748.html# (“International R&Dbased drug firms are comfortable with the registration system in Jordan; to date,
Embassy received no complaints of excessive bureaucracy or delayed decisions by
the JFDA.”).
47. Id.
48. Id. ¶ 4.
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wronged—decided not to pursue the case.49

Disregarding the independence of the Jordanian judiciary and the
fact that the FTA itself did not include such an obligation, the cable
boldly states:
The weekly-dose case raises the general problem with data exclusivity
and NCE’s [new chemical entities] in Jordan. For example, an adult
dosage, a children’s dose, and a pre-school or infant dose—each with its
own set of data in support of JFDA approval—should receive, each in its
own turn, five years of protection, according to the manufacturer. But the
JFDA can’t square that proposition with its view of a single NCE
deserving only one period of five-year protection. As PhRMA and
individual companies read it, the FTA appears to come down more
strongly in favor of protections from “unfair competition” and to be more
favorable toward data exclusivity in the narrowest sense, for each dose.
The main FTA provisions on drugs—FTA Article 4, paragraph 22 and its
related footnotes—have yet to be interpreted in a manner acceptable to
all, however.50

If the United States had gotten its way, an additional protection
period would have prevented the generic medicine from entering the
market, a provision that would have hurt domestic consumers. The
U.S. interpretation takes a clear pro-protection approach that favors
U.S. pharmaceutical manufacturers but disregards the public interests
of developing countries.
In another case, a dispute over a cancer treatment raised the issue
of when the exclusivity period actually begins: when the drug is first
used under a tender or when it is first approved by the regulator. An
embassy cable reports that, in 2001, an originative firm’s cancer
treatment was approved for tender in a Jordanian government
hospital.51 Afterward, the manufacturer filed a formal request for
JFDA approval. However, in 2005, a generic of the same drug,
produced by an Australian company, appeared on the market, less
than five years after the original drug had received JFDA approval.52
In response to the complaint, the JFDA Director General explained
49. Id. ¶ 5.
50. Id. ¶ 6.
51. Id. ¶ 9. In these special tender cases, a waiver is often obtained through the
traditional JFDA approval process.
52. Id.
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that JFDA officials reasoned that the drug had enjoyed five years of
data exclusivity, dating from the special tender bid in 2001.53
The innovator manufacturer disagreed, arguing that the data
exclusivity period began with the more recent JFDA approval.54 The
JFDA maintained its position that the same rule applies to all
situations: the data exclusivity period begins the moment a drug gets
approval under the tender and not upon subsequent registration.55
Unhappy with the JFDA’s interpretation, the U.S. Embassy called for
a review of the FTA, while USAID’s AMIR program called upon
legal consultants to conduct a gap analysis to provide legislative
recommendations.56 The U.S. Embassy went even further, boldly
urging that Jordan’s JFDA should include a PhRMA representative
on the High Committee for Drugs.57 This request clearly reflects a
high level of U.S. interference in the work of the JFDA. Conversely,
the United States would likely object if the same request was made
by a Jordanian—or even a European—delegation demanding the
inclusion of their representative on the board of the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (“USFDA”).
The two previous examples demonstrate how the United States
attempted to broadly interpret FTA provisions and to influence the
decisions of public health authorities in Jordan, so as to grant longer
protection periods of data exclusivity to pharmaceutical innovators.
It also shows how U.S. authorities tried to influence the process of
granting approvals to generic medicines, in accordance with
PhRMA’s interpretation. However, the FTA itself does not contain
any provisions that obligate Jordan to interpret the agreement in line
with the United States’ position.58
Empirical research also supports the argument that data exclusivity
protection measures had negative effects on public health in Jordan.

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. ¶ 10.
57. Id. (urging the JFDA to consider including a “PhRMA representative
among three private sector members on the committee”).
58. For more on impact, see EL SAID, PUBLIC HEALTH RELATED TRIPS-PLUS
PROVISIONS IN BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 7, and UNDP, supra
note 43.
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In 2007, Oxfam International published a study on the U.S.-Jordan
FTA.59 This study was one of the earliest that analyzed the impact of
FTAs upon public health and access to medicine in developing
countries. The findings of the study were alarming; they explicitly
stated that the U.S.-Jordan FTA had a negative impact on access to
medicine, finding that:
•

TRIPS-plus
rules,
particularly
data
exclusivity,
independently prevented generic competition for 79 per
cent of medicines launched by 21 multinational
pharmaceutical companies since 2001.

•

Additional expenditures for medicines with no generic
competitor, as a result of enforcement of data exclusivity,
were between $6.3m and $22.04m.60

In addition to the issue of data exclusivity, the U.S.-Jordan FTA
also included references to the protection of “new use.”61 New-use
protection aims at enabling new uses of known substances by issuing
a patent on the new use(s). Therefore, if a certain drug was found to
work in another field in which it was not protected, an additional
period of patent protection could be awarded for an already known
and registered drug, thereby extending the patent protection term
substantially. This process is referred to as “evergreening.”62
Once again, the cables provide evidence of how the United States
attempted to interpret broadly TRIPS-Plus provisions related to new
use, as stipulated under the U.S.-Jordan FTA. In one dispute, a drug
used as an anti-asthma therapy came onto the market in 2005, but
new chemical data trials showed that the drug was also effective for
59. OXFAM INT’L, ALL COSTS, NO BENEFITS: HOW TRIPS-PLUS INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RULES IN THE US-JORDAN FTA AFFECT ACCESS TO MEDICINES (2007),
available at http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/all%20costs,%20
no%20benefits.pdf.
60. Id. at 20. For a more recent study, see Ryan B. Abbott et al., The Price of
Medicines in Jordan: The Cost of Trade-Based Intellectual Property, 9 J. GENERIC
MEDS. 75 (2012).
61. See U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 3, art. 4.22 n.10 (“It is understood that
protection for ‘new chemical entities’ shall also include protection for new uses for
old chemical entities for a period of three years.”).
62. See generally C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, Evergreening,
Patent Challenges, and Effective Market Life in Pharmaceuticals, COLUMBIA
UNIVERSITY LAW AND ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER, No. 399 (May 3, 2011).
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those patients exhibiting both asthma and co-existing allergic
rhinitis. The JFDA approved the drug for the “new use,” but not for a
“new indication,” as U.S. representatives were asking for. The JFDA
justified its position by claiming that the “gray area of overlapping
uses does not permit a distinction,” and it argued that it was therefore
unwilling to grant an additional three years of exclusivity
protection.63 The JFDA’s reasoning supported domestic public
interest considerations.
The cables revealed PhRMA’s outrage on this issue; in PhRMA’s
view, when a product was approved for a new use, the period of data
exclusivity should be expanded from five to eight years, at minimum,
for that new use.64 The cable states that “after the innovator appealed,
and when [embassy officials] highlighted the appeal for the JFDA
[Director General], it appears the JFDA will be taking a second,
harder look at what ‘protection’ means.”65 It was not clear how the
JFDA handled the issue of new use following the appeal.
Scrutinizing the cables, a sense of frustration on the part of the
U.S. officials is evident, as a result of JFDA’s reluctant approach to
award additional TRIPS-Plus protection to drug manufacturers. This
frustration is apparent despite the fact that the JFDA’s position was
influenced by domestic public health considerations. The cables
further demonstrate U.S. dissatisfaction with the JFDA’s drugapproval process. One cable states that “[a]dding to manufacturer’s
concerns, the JFDA includes an extra layer of safety to its drug
approval process by requiring that a drug be on the open market in
one of seven countries with high safety standards for a full year
before it can receive a formal approval in Jordan.”66 The cable
unearths complaints about this strict requirement and the fact that the
JFDA’s drug-approval process may last up to a period of six months,
stating that “PhRMA companies deem this a technical barrier to
market access.”67 The U.S. position is tenuous, as the TRIPS
Agreement and the U.S.-Jordan FTA do not contain any obligations
for Jordan in this area but rather leave space for Jordan to set policy
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

U.S. Embassy, Cable 05AMMAN9748, supra note 46.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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in line with its national legal framework and administrative
procedures.
Dissatisfied that its discussions with the JFDA were largely
fruitless, the United States decided it was time to widen the scope of
the debate and engage other national players in the discussion. The
United States decided the next step would be to engage the Ministry
of Industry and Trade, bypassing the Ministry of Health altogether. It
was time to bring the FTA’s most powerful card to the table.
Through several exchanges with the U.S. Embassy, the JFDA, and
the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the United States demanded that
the government of Jordan abide “scrupulously” by its FTA
commitments regarding pharmaceuticals protection.68 Accordingly, it
would be imperative that more bilateral consultation be established
to implement the obligations of the FTA. The cable further explains
that the USAID’s AMIR program had already called upon legal
consultants to conduct a gap analysis to study whether relevant
legislation might be lacking in the country. As mentioned above, the
Embassy went even further, by boldly asking the JFDA to include a
PhRMA representative on the High Committee for Drugs.69
Additionally, the cable reports that the United States requested that
the Ministry of Industry and Trade—which seems to have been more
receptive to U.S. demands—should also have a member on the High
Committee for Drugs.70 Moreover, following one of the joint
meetings attended by the Minister of Industry and Trade, the JFDA
Director General, and U.S. Embassy representatives, the Minister of
Industry and Trade told U.S. representatives that Jordan wished to be
consistent with “international best practices and adhere to the
FTA.”71
The cable further reports that the Minister assured the
representatives Jordan would rectify the situation if its practices were
not in line with its FTA obligations.72 This reference reflects a
questionable position, considering that the notion of a uniform
“international best practices” does not exist in this particular area,
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id. ¶ 10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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where countries typically exercise considerable discretion. In any
case, the cable went further, reporting that the government of Jordan
had invited the U.S. government to provide its own “position papers
outlining any concerns” about the “international best practices.”73
The cables did not reveal what advice the United States gave in
relation to this request.
The United States has often proclaimed that these FTAs
(containing strengthened intellectual property rules of a TRIPS-Plus
nature) would facilitate and encourage technology transfer and
increase foreign direct investment (“FDI”) flows to its partner FTA
states,74 a claim that is unfortunately echoed by many uninformed
national politicians.75 For instance, a report published in 2004 by the
International Intellectual Property Institute (“IIPI) in partnership with
the AMIR program claimed that stronger intellectual property
protections are helping to transform Jordan into the leading
knowledge economy in the region and that Jordan’s pharmaceutical
sector has actually benefited from the strengthening of its intellectual
property regime.76 The report also claims that there is a growing
73. Id.
74. See Jordan Free Trade Agreement, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE,
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/
jordan-fta/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2012) (“The United States-Jordan FTA has
expanded the trade relationship by reducing barriers for services, providing
cutting-edge protection for intellectual property, ensuring regulatory transparency,
and requiring effective labor and environmental enforcement.”).
75. See, e.g., Ferris K. Nesheiwat, The Adoption of Intellectual Property
Standards Beyond TRIPS – Is It a Misguided Legal and Economic Obsession by
Developing Countries?, 32 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 361, 366 (2010)
(“Jordanian officials, most notably the under-secretary for Industry and Trade,
consistently cite the adoption of modern intellectual property laws in Jordan as a
prerequisite for foreign direct investment inflows into the Jordanian economy.”).
Furthermore, a recent study found that, in relation to trademark protection, “Judges
in Jordan explained that TRIPS-Plus is helpful because it raises awareness of and
respect for IPR among the domestic population and provides foreign investors with
greater comfort in doing business in the country. The enforcement provisions of
the FTA also provided additional flexibility that judges could use when meting out
penalties and sentences, and there were many technical assistance training sessions
and workshops that reportedly would not have happened without the FTA.” See
KOFF ET AL., supra note 28, at 29.
76. MICHAEL P. RYAN & JILLIAN SHANEBROOK, INT’L INTELLECTUAL PROP.
INST., ESTABLISHING GLOBALLY-COMPETITIVE PHARMACEUTICAL AND BIOMEDICAL TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES IN JORDAN: ASSESSMENT OF BUSINESS
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multinational presence, medical tourism has taken on new
importance, and the number of clinical trials in the country has
multiplied. The study continues by stating that intellectual property
reforms in Jordan have motivated local industry to cultivate a great
deal of “business activity that is intellectual property−intensive and
high value-added.”77
Once again, emerging evidence contradicts these claims. In its
2007 study on the U.S.-Jordan FTA, Oxfam International published
the following findings:
• There has been nearly no FDI by foreign drug companies in
Jordan since 2001 to synthesize or manufacture medicines
in partnership with local generics companies, and this has
harmed public health. The only FDI into Jordan by foreign
drug companies has been to expand scientific offices, which
use aggressive sales tactics to ensure that expensive
patented medicines are used in lieu of inexpensive generics.
• Stricter intellectual property rules have not encouraged
companies in Jordan to engage in R&D for medicines since
the passage of the FTA, thus these companies have not
developed any new medicines.
• New product launches in Jordan are only a fraction of total
product launches in the USA and the EU. Many new
medicines launched in Jordan are exorbitantly priced and
unaffordable for ordinary people. Few or no units of these
recently launched medicines have actually been purchased
on the local market.78
Others have reached similar conclusions in studying the impact of
expanding intellectual property protection in Jordan. One author, for
instance, states that “there is little, if any, relationship between FDI
and intellectual property standards, and . . . numbers constantly used
to prop up such a connection for Jordan are misused and cartoon-like
in their simplicity.”79

STRATEGIES AND THE ENABLING ENVIRONMENT 20 (2004).
77. Id.
78. OXFAM INT’L, supra note 59, at 20.
79. Nesheiwat, supra note 75, at 364.
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Similar findings were reiterated by U.S. Embassy cables. A 2008
cable explains that the withdrawal of the multinational
pharmaceutical giant Bristol Myers Squibb (“BMS”) from the
Jordanian market had, in fact, caused anxiety in the country.80 This
came following a statement made by the BMS vice president that the
company was about to close its Jordanian sales operations and that
its products would no longer be available for sale in the country. This
step was “part of a larger corporate strategy”; the BMS vice
president reported that this had nothing to do with the “local political
situation, the security situation, the ease/difficulty of doing business,
nor Jordan’s intellectual property rights (“IPR”) record.”81 The cable
added that the decision was met with “serious concerns and
confusion” by Jordanian businessmen, doctors, and government
officials.82
Furthermore, officials were concerned that this move, which
placed Jordan alongside countries such as Syria, Sudan, and Yemen
(from which BMS was also withdrawing), would send a negative
signal about Jordan’s business environment and would also limit the
availability of cancer drugs to its nationals. Jordanian government
officials made innumerable calls to the regional representative of
PhRMA, arguing that Jordan’s “efforts to improve IPR and the
attractiveness of the market are wasted if companies pull-out.”83
Despite Jordan’s commitment to provide higher levels of intellectual
property protection, the government was unable to persuade BMS to
change its decision to close its operations. Evidently, higher
intellectual property levels had no positive impact on the company’s
decision. PhRMA was in no mood to ride against the tide of a U.S.
firm and defend Jordan’s interests.
The example cited above clearly demonstrates that even with an
FTA containing a TRIPS-Plus protection regime, there are no
guarantees that powerful countries will seek to encourage their
MNEs to invest in developing-country partners, or even to preserve
80. U.S. Embassy, Cable 08AMMAN3017, US Pharmaceutical Company
Pulling Out of Jordan Creates Anxiety and New Opportunities (Nov. 5, 2008),
http://cables.mrkva.eu/cable.php?id=176772.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.

96

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[28:1

and sustain the level of investments that had already been established
prior to the signing of the FTA.
As this section reveals, the United States used various techniques
in pushing its TRIPS-Plus agenda, engaging a broad range of
Jordanian partners in the process. But an important question arises:
what lessons did the United States learn from its FTA experience
with Jordan?
To avoid any misinterpretation following the implementation of an
FTA, the United States revised its standard intellectual property
provisions for subsequent FTAs. Subsequent FTAs included more
detailed and comprehensive chapters dealing with intellectual
property protection than the chapter included under the U.S.-Jordan
FTA. For example, while the U.S.-Jordan FTA included only five
pages dedicated to intellectual property protection, the subsequent
U.S.-Oman and U.S.-Bahrain FTAs each included twenty-five pages
of intellectual property commitments.84 Therefore, despite the
negative effects stemming from intellectual property measures within
Jordan’s FTA, one might argue that Jordan was blessed to be the first
country to sign an FTA with the United States.

VI. AN UNFINISHED AGENDA?
THE MORE THE MERRIER
The agencies and groups representing U.S. interests operate
through an organized agenda that requires collaboration and
coordination of their efforts. The process often follows a clear and
defined pattern, summarized as follows. First, the U.S. Embassy
staff, in collaboration with multinational companies, identifies an
issue of interest (either a problem of current concern to U.S. industry

84. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the Kingdom of Bahrain on the Establishment of a Free Trade
Area, U.S.-Bahr., Sept. 14, 2004, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements/bahrain-fta/final-text; Agreement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the Sultanate of Oman on the
Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Oman, Jan. 19, 2006,
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/oman-fta/final-text;
Mohammed El Said, Surpassing Checks, Overriding Balances and Diminishing
Flexibilities: FTA-IPRs Plus Bilateral Trade Agreements – From Jordan to Oman,
8 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 243, 261 (2007).
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groups or the need for a legislative reform in the host country). Then
discussions are initiated with several local agencies and authorities.
This process often includes engagement through the provision of
advice, propositions for reform, and—depending on the nature of the
issue concerned—the use of stick-and-carrot techniques, if needed.
The following example demonstrates this process by describing
how U.S. industry groups attempted to achieve their objectives in
advocating TRIPS-Plus standards in the area of copyright protection
and enforcement in Jordan.
In one of the cables dating back to 2003, a U.S. Embassy official
reported that meetings with a number of Jordanian officials took
place to discuss a complaint related to the importation of pirated
software from Syria into the country.85 The complaint was initiated in
2002 by Electronic Arts (a U.S. entertainment software developer)
and was subsequently brought to the attention of the USPTO and the
U.S. Embassy in Jordan by the IIPA. The main claim, according to
the cable, was that Jordanian customs authorities had been releasing
unauthorized copies of Electronic Arts’ software, which was
imported from Syria into the local market without first seeking the
opinion of the National Library (the entity responsible for copyright
enforcement in Jordan). Electronic Arts asserted that Jordanian
customs had instead relied on approvals from the Ministry of
Information’s Censorship Office, which has no copyright
enforcement authority, as the basis for releasing the pirated goods.86
Although the initial assessment put forth in the U.S. Embassy cable
explains that the cause of this infraction was a “communications
breakdown within Jordan’s piracy interdiction system,”87 the cable
reassuringly explains that it was not “a willful attempt to circumvent
the existing IPR protection regime” in the country.88 The cable further

85. U.S. Embassy, Cable 03AMMAN1233, Engaging the GOJ on IPR
Complaint from Electronic Arts (Mar. 3, 2003), http://cables.mrkva.eu/
cable.php?id=6057.
86. Id. Notably, this represents clear interference in the country’s national
administrative framework, which is not related to intellectual property enforcement
and not part of Jordan’s obligations under the TRIPS Agreement or the U.S.Jordan FTA.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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states that “[n]evertheless, our interviews have highlighted gaps in the
current system that we hope to begin addressing through increased
training and retooling of the procedural and legislative framework for
IPR protection in Jordan.”89 Taking advantage of the presence of a
high-level Jordanian delegation in Washington for a concurrent
economic meeting, the USPTO took it upon itself to raise the
complaint to the Jordanian Industry and Trade Minister, who in turn
promised to review the complaint upon his return to the country.90
Subsequent meetings took place, which followed up on the complaint
and relayed U.S. concerns about Jordan’s intellectual property regime.
These meetings included representatives from the Ministry of Industry
and Trade, the Customs Directorate, the Amman Customs House, the
Jaber Border Crossing with Syria, the National Library, and the
Censorship Office. Ultimately, the Amman Customs House admitted
that such activity did take place in the past, due to a lack of
coordination amongst concerned agencies, but assured the U.S.
Embassy official that this would not be a problem in the future.91
Finally, the cable states that the U.S. Embassy was considering a
request for provision of additional training for line officers at border
points on intellectual property issues. The cable called for a review of
current intellectual property legislation and suggested that new
mechanisms were needed to ensure better coordination between the
concerned public authorities to enhance the National Library’s ability
to initiate enforcement and confiscation actions. The majority of
prescribed measures are classified as TRIPS-Plus in their nature.
This, however, was not the end of the story. Subsequent cables
show a high level of persistence and determination in U.S. efforts to
enforce its intellectual property−related demands. As Jordan was
expected to comply with its TRIPS-Plus FTA obligations, shortly
after the signing of the FTA, an opportunity arose. To ensure full
compliance, the United States tied intellectual property legislative
(including copyright) reform to its promise of much-needed
financial and economic assistance. Accordingly, amendments to the
national copyright legislation were reviewed as part of the USAIDsponsored “conditions precedent.” This exercise was tied to aid89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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related cash transfers, making it clear that only when legislative
changes were undertaken would economic assistance be provided.92
As a result, on March 31, 2005, a new FTA-compliant copyright
law containing several TRIPS-Plus conditions was published in the
official gazette.
One would think that the amendment to the copyright law would
suffice, thereby bringing the issue to an end. Unfortunately, this was
not the case. The cables, once again, reveal ongoing monitoring and
surveillance, aimed toward ensuring a high level of enforcement and
compliance with the new copyright law. In addition, the cables
identified other weak enforcement procedures and measures that,
from the U.S. point of view, required reform. In 2005, the U.S.
Embassy in Amman reported that “[w]ithin days of the [copyright]
law’s publication, the enforcement unit based in the National Library
conducted raids on 40 to 50 shops along Amman’s Garden Street.”93
The cable also stated that the raids were directed toward software
piracy activities, in which pirated software was confiscated and
infringers were referred for prosecution, in accordance with the new
copyright law. The cable affirmed a desire to ensure compliance and
expressed fears about the weakness of penalties imposed upon
infringers, stating that the United States “will attempt to follow these
cases through the courts to identify and report strengths or
weaknesses of the enforcement system.”94
Interestingly, the same cable shows some frustration with the
judiciary’s lack of enthusiasm for laying down severe penalties
against the infringers; it argued for the need to send a clearer
message that “crime does not pay.”95 As more awareness and
training were needed to ensure proper enforcement, the National
Library, with the assistance of USAID, planned to launch a public
campaign on intellectual property awareness and enforcement in the
country. A key aim of the campaign would be to “convince the
92. U.S. Embassy, Cable 04AMMAN6508, Jordan IPR – Two Steps Forward,
A Half Step Back (Mar. 8, 2004), http://cables.mrkva.eu/cable.php?id=19391.
93. U.S. Embassy, Cable 05AMMAN3171, IPR Enforcement Team Goes After
Copyright Law Violators (Apr. 20, 2005), http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/04/
05AMMAN3171.html.
94. Id. (emphasis added).
95. Id.
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judiciary to enforce the new penalties available under the Copyright
Law.”96 The cable clearly identified the judiciary as the next
institution to be targeted in its quest for stricter intellectual property
enforcement.
By observing global developments, it becomes evident that these
national discussions were not isolated from those taking place
internationally. In 2009, the IIPA submitted to the USTR a Special
Mention report on Jordan, highlighting some of the main areas of
concern (some of which were already included under the U.S.-Jordan
FTA). These areas included:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Anti-Circumvention
and
Technological
Protection
Measures (“TPMs”)
Appropriately Narrow Exceptions and Limitations
Compensatory Damages
Deterrent Statutory Maximum Fines
Seizure of Documentary Evidence
Ex Officio Enforcement Authority
Presumptions of Ownership and Subsistence of Copyright
Fixing Provision Allowing Alteration of Features in Seized
Materials, Which Impinges on Exclusive Adaptation Right
Customs/Border Provisions97

Unsurprisingly, most of these issues, which were raised at the
domestic level in Jordan, were discussed and later included in the
highly controversial Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(“ACTA”) in 2011.98

96. Id.
97. INT’L INTELLECTUAL PROP. ALLIANCE (IIPA), JORDAN: 2009 SPECIAL 301
REPORT ON COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 387 (2009), available at
http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2009/2009SPEC301JORDAN.pdf.
98. For more on the ACTA, see Margot E. Kaminski, An Overview and the
Evolution of the Anti-Counterfeiting Free Trade Agreement (ACTA), AM. UNIV.
WASH. COLL. OF LAW PROGRAM ON INFO. JUSTICE & INTELL. PROP. (PIJIP
Research Paper Ser. No. 17, 2011), available at http://digitalcommons.wcl
.american.edu/research/17/; Peter Yu, ACTA and Its Complex Politics, 3 WIPO J. 1
(2011).
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VII. OURS VS. THEIRS
One of the interesting insights the cables reveal is the relationship
between the major players (mainly the European Union and United
States) and the processes by which each perceives and monitors the
other’s initiatives in developing countries. Although competing
interests may dictate different strategies and approaches, both the
European Union and the United States are united in their vision for
raising the levels of intellectual property protection globally, through
various means including bilateral free trade and association
agreements.99
Although Jordan signed an association agreement (“AA”) with the
European Union in 1997, before inking an FTA with the United
States in 2001, it took five years to ratify the E.U. agreement.
Quipping about such a slow process, a 2002 U.S. Embassy cable
highlights the slowness and weakness of the E.U. AA, which
contains mild intellectual property obligations in comparison to those
in the U.S. FTAs. In the cable, U.S. officials brushed away fears
about its impact, stating that the E.U. agreement “does little for
Jordan’s Economy” and that the long ratification process had, in fact,
“frustrated Jordan and embarrassed the E.U. diplomats [t]here.”100
At the same time, the cables highlight the United States’ real
concern regarding the E.U.-Jordan AA: its fear of the European
Union’s attempt to bring Jordan and other partner countries in the
region in line with the European Union’s position on a number of
global issues currently subject to international debate. These issues
included labeling, genetically modified organisms (“GMOs”),
Sanitary Phytosanitary SPS measures, and other similar issues in the
WTO. One cable concludes that the U.S. Embassy in Amman will
“continue to monitor these efforts, and to work closely with the
[government of Jordan] to ensure it maintains its close partnership

99. See generally Mohammed El Said, The European TRIPS-Plus Model and
the Arab World: From Cooperation to Association—A New Era in the Global IPRs
Regime?, 28 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 143 (2007) (discussing the role of the European
Union in TRIPS-Plus agreements).
100. U.S. Embassy, Cable 02AMMAN2371, EU Association Agreement Does
Little For Jordan’s Economy (May 14, 2012), http://wikileaks.org/cable/2002/05/
02AMMAN2371.html.
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with the U.S. on central WTO issues.”101
Once again, this example shows the close and detailed monitoring
carried out by the United States with respect to developing countries’
interactions with other global players. It uncovers deliberate U.S.
aspirations and efforts to restore the balance in its favor, thus
preventing other major players from molding and influencing
developing countries’ position under the international framework.

VIII. THE FTAS CLUB
The cables further uncover a global aspiration that the United
States aims to achieve by linking its FTA partnerships. Accordingly,
the United States is using its FTAs to form alliances and groups that
would support its positions globally. This vision is not confined to
the United States; the European Union attempts to achieve a similar
outcome in the Arab world through its Barcelona Process and the
subsequent association agreements it has signed with a number of
Arab states. However, the U.S. position is unique as a result of the
politics and techniques it adopts to achieve that goal.
In 2003, a U.S. Embassy cable reported that Singapore’s Trade
Minister had passed a letter to the King of Jordan during the World
Economic Forum, hosted in Jordan, proposing an FTA between Jordan
and Singapore.102 Although an agreement of this nature would seem a
natural progression of the relationship between both countries as a
result of Singapore’s historical good relations with the region and its
Muslim community, one must take note of the U.S. role in steering the
two countries toward a closer relationship. Notably, both countries had
just signed an FTA with the United States. Thus, the question arises as
to where the idea of the Singapore-Jordan FTA originated.
The cable states that a senior Singaporean trade official had told
Singapore’s acting political and economic counsel that the Middle
East is “an important region, but one where Singapore’s economic
engagement has been minimal.”103 The cable goes further, indicating
101. Id.
102. U.S. Embassy, Cable 03AMMAN4185, Jordan/Singapore: US FTA
Partners Link Up? (July 10, 2007), http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/07/
03AMMAN4185.html.
103. Id.
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that the idea of the Singapore-Jordan FTA had “initially been raised
by then USTR Barshefsky, when the U.S. and Singapore were
planning to use the U.S.-Jordan FTA as a model for the U.S.Singapore FTA.”104 Shortly thereafter, in 2004, the Jordan-Singapore
FTA was signed.

IX. CONCLUSION
The recent release of U.S. Department of State cables provided the
public with a rare opportunity to view the back-door initiatives and
discussions involved in shaping and regulating intellectual property
between developed and developing countries through the use of
FTAs. From the U.S. position, this represents a historical
continuation of previous initiatives aimed toward raising the levels of
intellectual property rights globally. These efforts have been carried
out with little consideration for other countries’ interests. Remarks
made by President Obama in 2010 suggest that this policy will
continue with the same vigor in the near future:
What’s more, we’re going to aggressively protect our intellectual
property. Our single greatest asset is the innovation and the ingenuity and
creativity of the American people. It is essential to our prosperity and it
will only become more so in this century. But it’s only a competitive
advantage if our companies know that someone else can’t just steal that
idea and duplicate it with cheaper inputs and labor. There’s nothing
wrong with other people using our technologies, we welcome it—we just
want to make sure that it’s licensed, and that American businesses are
getting paid appropriately. That’s why USTR [the United States Trade
Representative] is using the full arsenal of tools available to crack down
on practices that blatantly harm our businesses, and that includes
negotiating proper protections and enforcing our existing agreements, and
moving forward on new agreements, including the proposed AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement.105

It is unlikely that this aggressive trend related to intellectual
property enforcement in developing countries will undergo significant

104. Id.
105. Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President at the ExportImport Bank’s Annual Conference (Mar. 11, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-export-importbanks-annual-conference.
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change. On January 24, 2012, in his State of the Union speech,
President Obama promised additional measures and assured American
industries of the U.S. position in protecting its interests, by stating:
It’s not right when another country lets our movies, music, and software
be pirated . . . . Tonight, I’m announcing the creation of a Trade
Enforcement Unit that will be charged with investigating unfair trade
practices . . . . There will be more inspections to prevent counterfeit or
unsafe goods from crossing our borders.106

Indeed, one would question the prudence of this policy in the long
run.107 However, this aggressive posture ignores the historical
policies adopted by the United States during its transition to
industrialization and innovation, which were heavily reliant on
others’ innovations. On the other hand, the U.S. position raises some
questions about the prudence of this, for both the United States and
the global community. As one author explains:
The United States’ aggressive decades-long push to ratchet up intellectual
property protections may come back to haunt it sooner than later. It is
easy to imagine that in the not-too-distant future, US consumers will be
paying more royalties to foreign rights holders. Pharmaceutical innovation
virtually has come to a halt in the US, with many blockbuster drugs about
to come off patent and very little new drugs in the pipeline. Many critics
contend that the US patent system is choking off innovation with strategic
patenting, patent thickets, and overly broad claims. Numerous in-depth
critiques of the US patent system have raised profound questions about
the wisdom of exporting our broken and dysfunctional system.108

On the other hand, the recent developments—or revolutions—
taking place in the Arab world, witnessed in the emergence of the
“Arab Spring,” are changing how governments are responding to

106. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address: An America Built to
Last (Jan. 24, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
2012/01/24/remarks-president-state-union-address.
107. There have been some recent calls within the United States for revisiting the
current innovation system and its reliance on science and technology. As Subra
Suresh, the Director of America’s National Science Foundation, stated recently, “We
must reexamine long-held assumptions about the global dominance of . . . American
science and technology.” Brain Gain: Why America Is Wrong to Fear Asian
Innovation, ECONOMIST (Jan. 21, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21543170.
108. Sell, supra note 20, at 22.
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their citizens’ aspirations. At the heart of these revolutions lies the
call for a more balanced, participatory, and transparent national
decision-making process. Careful consideration of the public interest
is fundamental for successful decision-making and policy-setting.
One is hopeful that the regulation of intellectual property at the
national levels is no exception.
Though often referred to as an “oasis of calm” in a turbulent
region,109 Jordan is not isolated from the recent developments in the
Middle East. The country is experiencing an unprecedented wave of
reform championed by King Abdullah II.110 References to political
and economic reform, transparency, and the fight against corruption
are commonplace in present-day headlines in Jordan. One can hope
that these developments and calls will reach those involved in
intellectual property policy-making and prompt them to adopt a more
balanced and participatory approach by engaging concerned
stakeholders and placing the public interest at the center of policymaking. For now, however, the morning after the signing of an FTA
remains a stormy one.

109. Ferry Biedermann, Jordan: An Oasis of Financial Calm, FIN. TIMES (June
23, 2010), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bd88daca-7d1f-11df-8845-00144feabdc0
.html#axzz21QSO6PjW.
110. See, e.g., MARWAN MUASHER, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE,
A DECADE OF STRUGGLING REFORM EFFORTS IN JORDAN: THE RESILIENCE OF THE
RENTIER SYSTEM (2011), available at http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/05/
11/decade-of-struggling-reform-efforts-in-jordan-resilience-of-rentier-system/1gf
(discussing King Abdullah II’s political reforms, including efforts at creating a
new government “to take speedy practical and tangible steps to unleash a real
political reform process that reflects [Jordan’s] vision of comprehensive reform,
modernization and development.”) (alterations in original).

